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Abstract
I study the e®ects of the heterogeneity of traders' horizons in a 2-period NREE
model where all traders are risk averse. Owing to risk premia, short termism generates
multiple equilibria. In particular two distinct patterns arise. Along the \low trading
intensity equilibrium," short termists anticipate a thinner second period market and,
owing to risk aversion, scale back their trades. This reduces both risk sharing and
information impounding into prices, enforcing a high returns' volatility-low price
informativeness equilibrium. Along the \high trading intensity equilibrium," the
opposite happens and a low volatility-high price informativeness equilibrium arises.
Thus, in the presence of short-term behavior and traders' risk aversion, periods of
high volatility are a signal of poor price informativeness.
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11 Introduction
This paper analyzes the e®ects of short-term behavior on stock market patterns in an
environment where traders have asymmetric information. Both empirical and theoretical
considerations motivate the analysis. On the one hand, instances of short term behavior
abound in ¯nancial markets. From day traders 1 to institutional investors 2 short termism
seems to characterize the behavior of an increasing proportion of market participants.
On the other hand, intuitive reasoning suggests that in a realistic market where price
movements are due to both information arrival and supply shocks, the risk borne by an
agent holding a positive inventory of the traded asset should have a di®erent e®ect on his
behavior depending on his time preferences. Indeed, short-term traders, faced with the
need of liquidating their position in the short run, have fewer opportunities to smooth their
inventory holdings' decisions. As a consequence, their behavior is strongly in°uenced by
the anticipation of price reaction to future order °ows. On the contrary, thanks to their
longer horizon, long termists can attain a better intertemporal asset allocation and react
less intensely to the expected °uctuations of asset prices. This di®erence, in turn, should
make market patterns dependent on the composition of the market.
Following this insight, I analyze a 2-period noisy, rational expectations equilibrium
model of stock-market trading based on Vives (1995). In the model, two classes of traders
interact: a sector of short-term, risk averse informed traders of measure ¹ > 0, and a sector
of long-term, risk averse informed traders of measure 1¡¹. 3 Risk aversion has two e®ects
on the market: ¯rst, informed agents, besides speculating on their private information,
also act as market makers; second - and consequently - equilibrium prices are in°uenced
by both information arrival and liquidity supply.
This last e®ect, depending on the trading horizon of informed speculators, has a di®erent
impact on their trading activity. Long-termists, when in period 1 choose their position,
1\In the 1980s, it was Wall Street's takeover barbarians. Today it is the amateurs in jeans and sneakers
who sit in front of a computer and trade 40-50 times in a day." The Economist, \In praise of day traders,"
May 13th 1999.
2For instance, Kahn and Winton (1998) argue that \...traditionally [Institutional Investors] were stock
pickers who tried to beat the market through trading; if a ¯rm whose stock they held seemed headed
for trouble, these investors headed for the door (the Wall Street rule)." Also, Wermers (1999) \Many
newsmedia commentators ...tend to believe that institutional investors focus excessively on short-term
trading strategies..." Finally, Tirole (2001) \...institutions shy away from sitting on boards and mostly
act as short-term players."
3A number of authors have analyzed dynamic rational expectations equilibrium models, see e.g. Single-
ton (1987), Brown and Jennings (1989), Grundy and McNichols (1989), Vives (1995), and He and Wang
(1995).
2anticipate the volatility of the asset value using both the private and public information
available (i.e. the equilibrium price). Short-termists, on the contrary, cannot hold the asset
until the liquidation date and are, therefore, interested in anticipating the second period
price which in turn depends on their ¯rst period behavior. As a consequence, two possible
equilibria arise. If short term traders anticipate that second period price overreacts to the
order °ow they reduce the risk of their position by scaling back their trades. Thus, the
market's risk bearing capacity decreases in the second period, making the market thinner
and the second period price overreactive to the order °ow. The opposite happens if they
anticipate second period price underreaction. Therefore, in the presence of risk averse
traders, short-term behavior induces multiple equilibria.
The consequences for market performance depend on which of the two equilibria arises.
Along the low trading intensity equilibrium, short term traders speculate less aggressively
on their private signal. This reduces price informativeness in both periods and increases
returns' volatility. Along the high trading intensity equilibrium, the opposite happens
and a low volatility, high price informativeness equilibrium arises. In spite of its \good"
properties, the high trading intensity equilibrium is, however, unstable since the slope of
its aggregate excess demand function is positive. Therefore, a price decline, e.g. spurred
by a selling pressure, drives the market away from equilibrium. 4
Summarizing, in the presence of short-term behavior and traders' risk aversion (i) mar-
kets may become unstable ad (ii) periods of high volatility are a signal of poor price
informativeness. Hence, the usual explanation of a more volatile market as one where more
information is gathered (see e.g. Admati and P°eiderer, 1988) breaks down.
A number of authors have analyzed causes and e®ects of short-term behavior in ¯nancial
markets. Holden and Subrahmanyam (1996), provide a foundation for short termism.
They analyze a two period model where risk averse traders can collect either short or long
lived information (and thus trade once or twice) and a public signal, unrelated to their
information, is periodically released to the market. In such a context traders' decisions
about information collection depend on their degree of risk aversion. Indeed, as the public
signal bu®ets traders' position - negatively a®ecting their expected utility - the more risk
averse a trader is the less willing to collect long lived information he becomes. As a
consequence, for a su±ciently high degree of risk aversion, all traders concentrate on short
lived information and long termists disappear from the market. Vives (1995) analyzes the
e®ects of short term behavior on price informativeness. In a N ¸ 2-period model, he
4This peculiar feature of the high trading intensity equilibrium is reminiscent of traders' behavior around
market crashes (see Barlevy and Veronesi, 2002, and Gennotte and Leland, 1990).
3shows that controlling for patterns of information arrival, price informativeness depends
on speculators' trading horizons. In particular, when information arrival is concentrated
in the ¯rst period, the price in period N is more informative in the market with long term
traders than in the one with short termists. Conversely, when traders receive information
at a constant rate the reverse happens and short term trading delivers a more informative
last period price. Di®erently from the present context, in his model prices are set by a
competitive, risk neutral market making sector and this renders the equilibrium in the
market with short term traders unique. 5
Others have investigated the multiplicity issue in market microstructure models. Pagano
(1989), in a OLG model with symmetric information, shows that in the presence of trans-
action costs, anticipated high volatility levels make traders unwilling to enter the market,
reducing risk sharing and leading to thin markets. Dennert (1991), shows that high volatil-
ity equilibria can be self-ful¯lling in the steady state of a OLG market with di®erential
information. Dow (1999) shows that thin markets, by crowding out the liquidity supply
of risk hedgers, can be a self-ful¯lling phenomenon. In his model, a risk averse agent
trades-o® the advantages of hedging a shock to his wealth, with the costs of trading in
a market where a bid-ask spread arises owing to asymmetric information. For some pa-
rameter con¯guration, the model displays a high and a low liquidity equilibrium. In the
thin market equilibrium, only more risk averse traders enter, while in the deep market
equilibrium more risk tolerant traders participate. This analysis is clearly related to the
present paper. However, in Dow (1999) equilibrium multiplicity relies on the heterogeneity
of traders' risk aversion, while in the present context it is the result of traders' risk aversion
and short term investment horizons. Finally, Admati and P°eiderer (1988) in their analysis
of trading patterns show that informed and discretionary liquidity traders' entry decisions
in the market are strategic complements. As a consequence multiple equilibria arise. In
particular, equilibria where liquidity traders cluster are also those where returns are more
volatile and prices more informative. Notice, however, that in their case informed traders
are risk neutral. Thus, highly volatile returns do not shy informed away from the market.
In the present case, on the contrary, risk averse informed traders are crowded out by highly
volatile markets rendering the price less informative.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section, I outline the model's assumptions,
de¯ne notation and show existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in the case in which
only long term traders are in the market. In the third section I introduce a positive measure
5At least in the 2-period case. See further, remark 5.
4of short-term traders and show existence and multiplicity of equilibria in this market. I
then study both analytically (section 3.2) and numerically (section 4) the e®ects on market
performance of an increase in the size of the short term trading sector. Section 5 tackles
the issue of equilibrium stability. A ¯nal appendix collects most of the proofs.
2 The Model
Trading happens over 2 periods, and there are two types of agents: a continuum of informed
speculators (when long termists, maximizing the expected utility of their ¯nal wealth Wi2 =
P2
n=1 ¼in; when short-termists, maximizing the expected utility of each period's pro¯ts) and
noise traders. The asset payo® v is normally distributed v » N(¹ v;¿ ¡1
v ). Every informed
speculator i has CARA utility function with risk-tolerance parameter ° > 0 and receives
a noisy signal of the asset liquidation value sin = v + ²in in each period n, where ²in »
N(0;¿¡1
²n ), ²in and v are independent and errors are independent across agents and periods. I




In period 1 informed agents have the private signal si1 available, while in period 2
they have the vector s2





n=1 ¿²nsin) is su±cient for the sequence s2
i in the estimation of v. An
informed agent i in period n submits a limit order Xin(~ sin;pn¡1;¢) indicating the position
desired at every price pn, contingent on the information available. Noise traders' demand
is normally distributed un » N(0;¿¡1
u ), u1 and u2 are independent. 6 Finally, un, and
²in are independent for all i;n. I restrict attention to linear equilibria where a centralized
mechanism aggregates orders and sets the equilibrium price that clears the market for the
asset.
2.1 The Benchmark
In this section I derive the unique linear equilibrium of the market with only long term
traders. The result obtained in proposition 1 coincides with the unique linear equilibrium
found by He and Wang (1995) in the absence of a public signal and when the correlation
across noise shocks is null. 7 Alternatively, one can see it as a generalization of a two-period
6The random variables fu1;u2g can equivalently be interpreted as the increments in the stock supply
in the two trading periods as in He and Wang (1995).
7Using their notation, when ¾± = 0 and a£ = 1. As one can verify, gross trading intensity in their
equilibrium has a closed form solution given by ¹
¡1
1 = (1=¸w1) and ¹
¡1
2 = (1=¸w2) that in our notation
5version of Vives (1995) to a market with risk averse dealers. 8
Proposition 1 In the market with long term, informed speculators there exists a unique
linear equilibrium where prices are given by po = ¹ v, p3 = v, and for n = 1;2, pn =
¸nzn + (1 ¡ ¸n¢an)pn¡1 and strategies are given by:
xin = an(~ sin ¡ pn) + °¿n(E[vjz
n] ¡ pn); (1)
where an = °(
Pn
t=1 ¿²t), ¢an = an¡an¡1, zn = ¢anv+un, zn = fztgn
t=1, ¿n = (Var[vjzn])¡1,
¸n = (1 + °¿u¢an)=°¿in, ¿in = (Var[vjzn;~ sin])¡1.
Proof. See appendix. QED
xin indicates a trader i's position in period n. It has two components. The ¯rst one
re°ects the trader's speculative position and depends on the di®erence between his private
signal and the equilibrium price weighted by private precision. The second one captures i's
market making position and depends on the di®erence between the market expectation and
the equilibrium price weighted by public precision. The more risk tolerant the trader is, the
more aggressively he trades. ¢an is the net trading intensity of period n and indicates the
net change in traders' desired speculative positions across period n¡1 and n. In particular,
using the convention ao = 0, ¢a1 = a1 > 0 and ¢a2 = a2 ¡a1 ¸ 0. zn is the informational
content of period n order °ow. It conveys a signal about the change in traders' aggregate
speculative position due to private information (across periods n¡1 and n) garbled by the
net demand of liquidity traders in period n. Finally, ¸n is the reciprocal of market depth
in period n and measures the period n price reaction to the public order °ow.
As in each period speculators trade on private information and absorb liquidity shocks,
asset prices react both to information arrival and liquidity supply.9 To see this, suppose
¢an > 0 and zn > 0. Observing this signal, traders infer that informed speculators
are increasing their speculative position. This signals good news about the asset pay-o®
leading to an upward revision of its conditional expectation. Suppose now that ¢an = 0.
In this case no new private information arrives to traders and their aggregate speculative
position does not change. However, selling the asset at the previous period equilibrium
correspond respectively to a1 ´ °¿²1 and a2 ´ °(¿²1 + ¿²2). See He and Wang (1995), Corollary 2, p. 943.
8Vives (1995) considers a market where prices are set by a sector of uninformed, competitive, risk
neutral market makers, while in the present model informed traders \price" the asset. However, it is easy
to show that adding a sector of uninformed, competitive, risk averse market makers does not qualitatively
a®ect the results of the paper (see Cespa, 1999).
9As e.g. in Subrahmanyam (1991), Admati and P°eiderer (1991), and Brown and Zhang (1997)
6price exposes traders to the risk of netting a price lower than its actual liquidation value.
To be compensated for this risk they revise upwards the equilibrium price. On the basis of
this intuition, ¸n can be decomposed in the following way:
¸n =
¿u¢an







Part (a) of the above expression is the OLS coe±cient of the news contained in the or-
der °ow (zn) in the regression of the pay-o® (v) over informed speculators' information
set (fzn;~ sing). It captures the adverse selection component of market depth i.e. price
movements due to the presence of informed traders in the market. 10 Part (b) is the prod-
uct of traders' risk aversion and the conditional variance of the asset pay-o® given their
information set. It captures the risk premium traders require to take a position in the
asset.
If the asset is priced by a sector of risk neutral, competitive market makers, risk averse
informed traders only speculate on private information, the risk premium disappears and
prices only react to the arrival of new information (as e.g. in Vives, 1995, and Dow and
Rahi, 2000 and 2002). The relevant second period depth measure in such a market is then
given by ¯ = ¢a2¿u=¿2. 11 Let's de¯ne a measure of the e®ect of traders' risk aversion on





Proposition 2 In every equilibrium of the market with long term, informed speculators:
(1) price precision in period n is given by ¿n = ¿v + ¿u
Pn
t=1(¢at)2 and (2) the conditional
















where ® = ¯=¸2.
10Note that its sign coincides with the sign of the net change in traders' desired speculative positions
between dates n ¡ 1 and n, i.e. ¢an.
11See Vives (1995). In the present model as informed traders \price" the asset the adverse selection
e®ect is weaker than when they only speculate on private information; this is so because informed traders
have two sources of information to disentangle noise from fundamentals in the order °ow. When a sector of
competitive, risk neutral, uninformed market makers is added to the model, informed traders are \crowded-
out" from the market making activity and prices only react to new information. The adverse selection
e®ect (in the second period) is then ¯ = (¢a2¿u=¿2) > (¢a2¿u=¿i2).
7Proof. For part 1, in every linear equilibrium pn is informationally equivalent to zn. Hence,
Var[vjpn] = Var[vjzn] = ¿¡1






u . If ¢a2 6= 0, multiplying numerator and denominator of the previous expression
by (¢a2)2¿u¿2 and collecting parameters, I obtain the result in the proposition. QED
The conditional volatility of returns is the result of the composite e®ect of (a) the
reduction in the conditional variance of the asset liquidation value due to the arrival of




2 )) and (b) the e®ect that traders' risk aversion induces on
second period depth (the factor ®¡2). Point (a) above refers to the standard explanation of
returns' volatility in a semi-strong e±cient market where the only source of price movements
is information arrival; point (b) is peculiar to the present market where risk premia also
play a role in a®ecting returns' volatility.
Remark 1 Owing to speculators' risk aversion, p2 is not a su±cient statistic for fz1;z2g in
the estimation of v. Thus, traders condition second period demand on both z1 and z2 (and
their private information). In other words, as in He and Wang (1995), they are chartists.
In the rest of the paper, two di®erent patterns of private information arrival will be
considered: the \concentrated" arrival of information case, where traders receive a private
signal in the ¯rst period only (i.e. ¿²1 > 0 and ¿²2 = 0); and the case of \constant" arrival
of information, where traders receive a signal of constant precision across time (i.e. ¿²t = c
for t 2 f1;2g).
3 The Market with Short-Term Traders
In this section I study the e®ect of introducing a positive measure ¹ of short term traders
on the equilibrium derived in proposition 1. Short termists are endowed with the same
information as long term traders but maximize the expected utility of short run pro¯ts.
Indicating with xis;1 (xil;1) the ¯rst period position held by a short (long) termist, the
following result applies:
Proposition 3 Linear equilibria of the market where a measure 0 < ¹ < 1 of short termists
and a measure 1¡¹ of long termists trade exist and are characterized by the following pair
of prices and strategies:
1. prices: po = ¹ v, p1 = ¸1z1 + (1 ¡ ¸1a1)¹ v, p2 = ¸2z2 + (1 ¡ ¸2¢a2)p1l and p3 = v;
82. second period strategies are as in proposition 1; short and long term traders' ¯rst
period strategies are given respectively by:





(p1l ¡ p1); (2)






(p1l ¡ p1); (3)
where p1l = ¸1lz1+(1¡¸1la1)¹ v, ¸1l = (1+°¿ua1)=(a1+°¿1), ¸2 = (1+°¿u¢a2)=(a2+







® = (¯=¸2), and an explicit expression for ¸1 is given in the appendix.
Proof. See the appendix. QED
As in proposition 1 in the ¯rst period long termists speculate on private information
the more aggressively (a) the higher is the precision of their private signal and (b) the more
risk tolerant they are. 12
Two factors a®ect short termists' trading intensity. First, they react positively to ° and
¿²1 and take into account the informativeness of second period price (¿2). The reason is as
in Vives (1995): given that they liquidate their position in the second period, they try to
predict p2. However, their signal is about v, therefore the closer is p2 to v (the higher is
¿2) the more informative is their private signal about p2 and the more intensely they trade.
Second, to the extent that speculators' risk aversion a®ects second period depth, they scale
up (down) their trading intensity depending on the value of ®.
The second and third terms in (2) and (3) capture traders' market making activity.
Di®erently from proposition 1, traders now have two market making motives. On the one
hand, they absorb the liquidity shock. On the other hand, they stand ready to absorb those
inventories that, owing to the di®erent horizons traders have, are unloaded in the market.
Notice that (4) implicitly de¯nes a1s. Indeed, when a short termist chooses his position
in the ¯rst period, he anticipates that he will unload it in the next period. This makes ¯rst
period trading intensity depend on second period depth. However, to the extent that ¸2
is a function of a1s, price reaction to second period order °ow in turn depends on traders'
¯rst period behavior. Therefore, second period depth and ¯rst period trading intensity are
simultaneously determined in equilibrium by the solution of (4).
12The variables p1l and ¸1l represent, respectively, the equilibrium price and the market depth in a
market with only long term traders computed with the parameters of the heterogeneous horizons market.
9Corollary 1 In every equilibrium of the market with short term traders: (1) a1l > 0 and
a1s > 0, and (2) ® > 0.
Proof. See the appendix QED
In equilibrium both long and short term traders put a positive weight on ¯rst period
private information. Di®erently from what happens in the market with long term traders,
here ® > 0 even if no new information arrives to traders in the second period (i.e. when
¢a2 = 0).
To understand the e®ect of short term horizons on the market, it is useful to start by
considering the extreme case where ¹ = 1.
3.1 The Case ¹ = 1
Suppose that ¹ = 1. When the arrival of information is concentrated in the ¯rst period
(i.e. ¿²2 = 0) a closed form solution to (4) can be obtained as shown by the following
proposition.
Proposition 4 (Multiplicity of Equilibria) In the market with only short term traders,
when ¿²2 = 0, there exist two linear equilibria where: (1) prices are given by p3 = v, po = ¹ v,
p2 = ¸2z2 + (1 ¡ ¸2¢a2)p1l and






(2) strategies are as in proposition 3, and (3) ¯rst period trading intensities are given
by a11s = ((1 + 2°2¿²1¿u) + (1 + 4°2¿²1¿u)1=2)=(2°¿u); a12s = ((1 + 2°2¿²1¿u) ¡(1 + 4
°2¿²1¿u)1=2)=(2°¿u); and satisfy: a12s < a1l < a11s; and ®(a12s) < 1 < ®(a11s).
Proof. See the appendix. QED
With concentrated arrival of information, short term horizons induce equilibrium multi-
plicity: a high and a low trading intensity equilibrium arise (respectively HTIE, designated
by subindex 1, and LTIE, designated by subindex 2). The intuition is as follows. In choos-
ing their ¯rst period speculative position, traders need to forecast second period price.
However, p2 is in turn a function of ¯rst period speculative trading intensity. Thus, to
improve their forecast of p2 traders need to guess whether second period price will over or
underreact to the order °ow (respectively whether ® will be lower or higher than 1). 13 If
13Price over and underreaction here refers to how prices would react in a market with risk neutral market
makers where depth incorporates no risk premium.
10they anticipate ® < 1 their ¯rst period position becomes riskier and they underreact to
their ¯rst period signal (a12s < a1l). As a2 = a1l > a12s, the aggregate speculative posi-
tion increases in the second period (¢a2 > 0). This leads to a positive adverse selection
e®ect that adds to the risk premium in making the price overreact (® < 1). Conversely, if
they anticipate ® > 1, they overreact to their ¯rst period signal (a11s > a1l). In this case
a2 = a1l < a11s and traders' aggregate speculative position decreases in the second period
(¢a2 < 0). This leads to a negative adverse selection e®ect 14 that o®sets the positive risk
premium and increases second period market depth. As a consequence, ® > 1. 15
A consequence of the above result is that along the HTIE, traders' speculative position
decreases across period 1 and 2 (¢a2 < 0). This is due to the di®erent estimation problem
that agents face in the two periods. In period 1 agents forecast a price that is endogenous
to their trading activity. Along the HTIE, they anticipate that the market underreacts in
the second period, hence their speculative position in the ¯rst period becomes less risky
and they overreact to their private signal, choosing a high a1¢s. Conversely, second period
traders only need to forecast the asset pay-o® when choosing their position. Hence, the
intensity with which they speculate on private information (a2 = a1l) is lower than a1¢s. As





2 (a12s)) second period depth along the HTIE (LTIE). The
next result characterizes depth along the two equilibria.
Proposition 5 (Market Depth) With concentrated arrival of information, in the market
with short term traders: (1) ¸2(a11s) < 0 < ¸2(a12s), and (2) j¸2(a11s)j < ¸2(a12s).
Proof. See the appendix. QED
Along the HTIE ¸2 < 0, i.e. the price reacts negatively to the informational content of
the order °ow. This type of anomaly, typical in a multi-asset framework (see e.g. Admati,
14Notice that ¢a2 can only be negative in the presence of short term traders since, as shown in propo-
sition 1, a2 ¸ a1l.
15An anonymous referee suggested the following alternative intuition to proposition 4. From proposition 3
we observe (a) a1¢s decreases with ¸2 and (b) ¸2 decreases with a1¢s. Therefore, these two variables are
interdependent and simultaneously determined in equilibrium. This gives rise to equilibrium multiplicity.
In particular, two equilibria arise: (i) a high trading intensity equilibrium where both a1¢s and ¸2 are
large and (ii) a low trading intensity equilibrium where both variables are small. The fact that these two
variables are either jointly small or jointly large is due to points (a) and (b).
16Therefore, it is \as if" the impact of period 1 speculative position on second period depth created an
incentive to speculate more intensely. In the second period, traders have no way to a®ect the liquidation
price they face in period 3. Therefore, such an incentive disappears and makes (along the HTIE) second
period desired speculative position smaller than the ¯rst period one.
111985), here depends on the fact that, as noted above, along the HTIE, the change in
investors' desired speculative position across dates 1 and 2 (i.e ¢a2) is negative. When
traders observe the public order °ow in the second period, they know that along the HTIE,
traders' desired speculative position is decreasing. Thus, if they observe z2 > 0, they
attribute the signal either to a negative pay o® (v < 0) or to a positive demand from
noise traders (u2 > 0). 17 As a result, they revise downwards their expectation of the asset
pay-o® so that ¸2 < 0.
Notice also that along the HTIE owing to the compensation between the positive risk
premium and the negative adverse selection e®ect, the market is deeper in the second
period.
Indicate with xis;1(a11s) (xis;1(a12s)) the ¯rst period position of a short term trader in
the HTIE (LTIE) and with xi1 the ¯rst period position of a trader in a market with long
termists only. The following result characterizes expected positions and volume along the
two equilibria.
Proposition 6 (Expected Positions and Volume) With concentrated arrival of infor-
mation, in the market with short term traders: (1) E [jxis;1(a12s)j] < E [jxi1j] < E [jxis;1(a11s)j],
and (2) E [jxi2 ¡ xis;1(a11s)j] > E [jxi2 ¡ xis;1(a12s)j] > E [jxi2 ¡ xi1j].
Proof. See the appendix. QED
To build the intuition for the above result de¯ne x¤
il;1 the position of a long term trader
in a market with ¹ = 1; then (2) can be expressed as follows: xis;1 = ½x¤
il;1 + (°¿v(½ ¡
1))=((a2 + °¿2)(z1 ¡ E[z1])): Therefore, in the HTIE (i.e. when ½(´ a1s=a1l) > 1), short
term speculators scale up their trades with respect to a long termist and accommodate
unexpectedly high order °ows. The opposite happens along the LTIE (i.e. if ½ < 1). As in
the second period both trader types' positions coincide, volume is always higher with short
term traders than with long termists.
I conclude this section by studying the e®ects of short horizons on returns' volatility
and price informativeness. Indicate with ¿n(a11s) (¿n(a12s)) and with ¿n(a1l) respectively,
the period n price precision calculated in the HTIE (LTIE) and the one calculated in a
market with long term traders only. Furthermore, de¯ne Var[p2jp1;a11s] (Var[p2jp1;a12s])
as the conditional volatility of returns calculated along the HTIE (LTIE).
Proposition 7 (Price Informativeness and Volatility of Returns) With concen-
trated arrival of information, in the market with short term traders: (1) ¿n(a12s) < ¿n(a1l) <
17Indeed, since z2 = ¢a2v + u2, if z2 > 0, given that along the HTIE ¢a2 < 0, either v < 0 or u2 > 0.
12¿n(a11s), for n = 1;2, and (2) Var[p2jp1;a11s] < Var[p2jp1;a12s].
Proof. For part 1 when n = 1, ¿1(a1¢s) = ¿v + a2
1¢s¿u, while ¿1(a1l) = ¿v + a2
1l¿u. Then,
¿1(a1¢s) ¡ ¿1(a1l) > 0 if and only if a1¢s > a1l. When n = 2, if ¿²2 = 0, a2l = a1l = °¿²1.
Therefore, ¿2(a1¢s)¡¿2(a1l) = 2a1l¿u(a1¢s ¡a1l) > 0 if and only if a1¢s > a1l. For part 2, see
the appendix. QED
Thus, a market populated by short term traders only, along the HTIE delivers more
informative prices than one where only long termists act. For n = 1, the reason is obvious.
For n = 2, it is interesting to contrast the result with Vives (1995) who ¯nds that when
¿²2 = 0, the precision of the ¯nal price is always higher with long term traders. The
intuition for his result is based on the following three facts: (i) price precision is a quadratic
function of net trading intensities, 18 (ii) total trading intensity is the same independently
of speculators' horizons and (iii) short term traders always trade less intensely than long
termists. When ¿²2 = 0 long termists concentrate all their trading activity in the ¯rst
period. On the contrary, short termists spread it across both periods. Thus, in the market
with long term traders, the intertemporal distribution of net trades is more unequal than
in the market with short termists and price informativeness is higher. In the present
model, this is what happens in the LTIE. However, owing to the compensating e®ect
of the risk premium, the HTIE may also realize. Then, the degree of inequality in the
distribution of net trades becomes higher when short term traders are in the market and
price informativeness is higher.
The second result shows that along the LTIE, the conditional volatility of returns is
higher than along the HTIE. The intuition is that if short term traders anticipate lower
second period depth, they scale back their trading intensity. This reduces the total risk
bearing capacity of the market and the second period depth leading to a high volatility
equilibrium.
Remark 2 According to proposition 7, in the presence of short termists, a market with
high conditional volatility of returns delivers less informative prices. 19 Other authors have
related returns' volatility to price informativeness (see e.g. Admati and P°eiderer, 1988,
and Foster and Viswanathan, 1990). Admati and P°eiderer (1988) ¯nd that a high returns'
volatility is positively related to a high price informativeness. This is due to the \clustering"
18Thus, it works like an inequality index in the distribution of net trading intensities, being higher when
their distribution across time is more unequal
19Numerical simulations show that the same results hold when the °ow of information arrival is constant.
See section 4.
13e®ect implied by the presence of discretionary liquidity traders in the market: when more
liquidity traders concentrate in a given period during the day, strategic informed speculators
¯nd it more pro¯table to trade. As a consequence, more information is impounded into the
price and returns are more volatile. However, speculators in their model are risk neutral
and do not bear the consequences of trading in a more volatile market. By contrast, in
this model, risk averse informed traders may be crowded out by highly volatile markets
rendering prices less informative. Hence, proposition 7 shows that the usual explanation of
a more volatile market as one where more information is gathered may break down in the
presence of risk averse, short term informed traders.
Remark 3 Comparison of the level of volatility with short term trading to that with long
term trading is di±cult to handle analytically and numerically does not give clear-cut
results. Simulations have been run for the concentrated arrival of information case with
¿v;¿u;¿²1;° 2 f:1;:4;:7;1g. In each set of simulations the value of the variance has been com-
puted letting in turn ¿v, ¿u, ¿²1 or ° vary between f1;2;:::;10g. When ¿v 2 f1;2;:::;10g,
Var[p2jp1;a11s] < Var[p2jp1;a1l] < Var[p2jp1;a12s]. However, for other parameterizations,
this result is no longer true. 20
Remark 4 The result on volatility is reminiscent of Dennert (1991) who shows that in the
steady state solution of a stock market model with OLG and asymmetric information two
equilibria arise: one with high and one with low price volatility. 21
Remark 5 The multiplicity result relies on the assumptions of traders' risk aversion and
perfectly competitive behavior. Adding to the model a sector of uninformed, competitive,
risk averse dealers with risk tolerance °U, it is possible to show that as °U ! 1, the set
of equilibria reduces to a singleton (Cespa, 1999). In particular, as in Vives (1995), 22 the
HTIE cannot arise due to dealers' risk neutrality. Indeed, even if traders overreacted to
their ¯rst period signal, there would not be any positive risk premium in the second period
to compensate the negative adverse selection e®ect and make the price underreactive.
Turning to the competitive behavior assumption, intuitively, the introduction of a
\large" informed trader in the market should eliminate the HTIE. Indeed, Caball¶ e and
20For example, letting ¿²1 2 f1;2;:::;10g, for high values of the signal precision Var[p2jp1;a11s] >
Var[p2jp1;a1l]. Similar patterns arise for the other parameter values and for the case of constant arrival of
information.
21According to Dennert (1991), an economy is in a steady state, if prices are identically distributed i.e.
pt » p » N(E[p];Var[p]);8t.
22See Vives (1995), Remark 3.1, p. 139.
14Krishnan (1992) in their multi-asset extension of Kyle (1985) show that to avoid price
manipulation the matrix that maps order °ows into prices must be positive de¯nite. As a
consequence, each price positively reacts to its own order °ow. Thus, imperfect competition
on traders' side should rule out the possibility of having a negative depth.
3.2 The Case ¹ < 1
Building on the insight gained by studying the market with only short term traders, in
this section I focus on the general model with short and long termists. The next result
generalizes proposition 4 to the case 0 < ¹ < 1.
Corollary 2 In the market where a sector of short term traders and one of long termists
(respectively of measure 0 < ¹ < 1 and 1 ¡ ¹) interact, when the arrival of information
is concentrated in the ¯rst period (i.e. when ¿²2 = 0), there exist two linear equilibria.
Traders' ¯rst period trading intensities are such that a12s < a1l < a11s and a1l = °¿²1.
Proof. See the appendix. QED
Indicate with a1k ´ ¹a1ks +(1 ¡ ¹)a1l, ¸
¡1
2 (a1k), Var[p2jp1;a1k] and ¿n(a1k), k;n = 1;2,
respectively total ¯rst period trading intensity, second period depth, returns' volatility and
period n price informativeness along equilibrium k.
With concentrated arrival of information, a straightforward generalization of proposi-
tions 5 and 7 gives the following corollary:
Corollary 3 In the market where a sector of short term traders and one of long termists
(respectively of measure 0 < ¹ < 1 and 1 ¡ ¹) interact, when the arrival of information
is concentrated in the ¯rst period 8¹ 2 (0;1): (1) ¸2(a12) > 0 and ¸2(a11) < 0; (2)
Var[p2jp1;a11] < Var[p2jp1;a12], j¸2(a11)j < ¸2(a12), and ¿n(a11) > ¿n(a12), k;n = 1;2.
Proof. See the appendix. QED
All the results in the above corollary mirror what has been shown for the case ¹ = 1
and the intuitions given for that case apply here. 23
The next proposition characterizes the e®ects of an increase in the size of the short-term
trading sector on price informativeness.
23Numerical simulations were run for the case of constant arrival of information (i.e. when ¿²2 = ¿²1)
and con¯rmed the results of corollaries 2 and 3. See section 4.
15Proposition 8 In every equilibrium of the market with short and long term traders,
when the arrival of information is concentrated in the ¯rst period: (1) @¿1(a11)=@¹ > 0,
@¿1(a12)=@¹ < 0; (2) @¿2(a11)=@¹ > 0, and @¿2(a12)=@¹ < 0 for 0 < ¹ < 1=2 + °a1l¿u=4
while (@¿2(a12)=@¹) > 0 otherwise.
Proof. See the appendix. QED
Along the HTIE, an increase in the measure of short term traders induces more infor-
mative second period equilibrium prices. This follows directly from proposition 7. Along
the LTIE, an increase in ¹ may lead to more as well as less informative second period prices.
The reason is that the inequality in the intertemporal distribution of net trades is high for ¹
close to zero (remember that in this case ¢a2 is close to zero) and decreases as ¹ increases;
for ¹ = 1=2 + °a1l¿u=4 it reaches its minimum (¢a2 = a1l and a1 = °a2
1l=(2 + °a1l¿u)) and
then increases again.
4 Numerical Simulations
In this section I collect the results of numerical simulations. Three groups of results are
presented. The ¯rst two verify that the results obtained in sections 3.1 and 3.2 carry over
to the case of constant arrival of information. The third group analyzes volume patterns
in the general model of section 3. 24
4.1 The Model with Constant Arrival of Information
First I run simulations to verify whether the results obtained in propositions 4, 5, 6 (2)
and 7 also hold when ¹ = 1 and traders receive information of a constant precision in
both periods with ¿v;¿u;¿²1 = ¿²2;° 2 f:1;:4;:7;1g. In each set of simulations the val-
ues of the trading intensities, price precisions, depth, volume and volatility in the mar-
ket with short term traders and in the one with long term traders, have been computed
letting in turn ¿v, ¿u, ¿²1 = ¿²2 or ° vary between f1;2;:::;10g (for example, when °
varied in the set f1;2;:::;10g, the remaining parameters varied in the set f:1;:4;:7;1g).
With this parameters choice: (1) a12s < a1l < a11s; (2a) ¿1(a11s) > ¿1(a1l) > ¿1(a12s),
(2b) ¿2(a11s) > ¿2(a12s) > ¿2(a1l); (3) j¸2(a11s)j < ¸2(a12s); (4) E [jxi2 ¡ xis;1(a11s)j] >
E [jxi2 ¡ xis;1(a12s)j] > E [jxi2 ¡ xi1j]; (5) Var[p2jp1;a11s] > Var[p2jp1;a12s]. As in the case
24Simulations were run with the aid of Mathematica r °.
16of concentrated arrival of information, in the ¯rst period a high and a low trading inten-
sity equilibrium arise. This makes the ¯rst period price more informative with short term
traders than with long term ones along the HTIE (and the reverse happen along the LTIE).
In the second period, as in Vives (1995), along the LTIE the sequence fp1;p2g is more infor-
mative owing to the higher inequality in the intertemporal distribution of net trades that
short term trading implies. Furthermore, in the HTIE this inequality increases rendering
prices even more informative. Points 3, 4 and 5 above con¯rm the results obtained for the
case of concentrated arrival of information.
Figures 1 and 2 (a) show the results of one of these simulations.
Please insert ¯gures 1 and 2 here.
Second, I run simulations to check whether corollaries 2 and 3 hold when the °ow of
information arrival is constant. In this case too numerical simulations con¯rm analytical
results showing that two equilibria exist where j¸2(a11)j < ¸2(a12), ¿n(a11) > ¿n(a12), n =
1;2 and Var[p2jp1;a11] < Var[p2jp1;a12]. Figures 2 (b{d) and 3 (a) show the results of one
of these simulations.
Second period depth decreases with ¹ both along the HTIE and the LTIE. Indeed,
along the HTIE when ¹ tends to 1, the risk premium decreases. As for the LTIE lower risk
sharing in the second period increases the risk premium, increasing ¸2.
Price precision increases with ¹ along the HTIE in both periods. In period 1 this is
just the result of the increased aggregate trading intensity; in period 2 a more unequal
intertemporal distribution of net trades arises. Along the LTIE price precision decreases
in period 1 and increases in period 2 with ¹. In the ¯rst case this is the result of the
decreased aggregate trading intensity. In the second case, this mirrors the e®ect found in
Vives (1995).
Please insert ¯gure 3 here.
174.2 Volume
The third group of results compares expected total volume across equilibria using the
general model of section 3. 25 Figure 3 (b,c) depicts the evolution of volume along the HTIE
(solid curve) and the LTIE as ¹ goes from :1 to :9 both when the arrival of information is
concentrated in the ¯rst period and when it is constant across periods. As one can verify,
expected total volume is higher along the HTIE than along the LTIE. While the pictures
are the result of a given parameter con¯guration, 26 results do not change qualitatively if
one considers other parameter values. Short termists trading activity has an externality
on long termists market making behavior. In particular, along the HTIE since the market
in the second period is deeper, long term traders increase the size of their market making
activity. This, coupled with the increased trading activity of short termists, generates a
high volume equilibrium result. Along the LTIE, the second period price overreacts to the
order °ow. This increases the riskiness of the long term traders' ¯rst period positions,
reducing their market making activity. As a result, a low volume equilibrium realizes.
Notice also that, in line with proposition 6, both along the HTIE and the LTIE volume
increases as ¹ tends to 1.
Remark 6 The evolution of market patterns displayed in the numerical simulations high-
lights the existence of a discontinuity at ¹ = 0. 27 The intuition is as follows: when ¹ = 0,
a short term trader anticipates that his trading behavior won't have any e®ect on second
period price. Therefore, he scales down his position with respect to a long term trader.
As ¹ increases, trading horizons do in°uence market patterns and, depending on which
equilibrium realizes, lead short termists to overreact (underreact) to their signal. In partic-
ular, even for a small value of ¹ the e®ect of short termists' overreaction (underreaction) is
su±ciently strong to substantially a®ect ¯rst period total trading intensity a1 and produce
the observed discontinuity.
5 Equilibrium Stability
Given that in the presence of short term traders the model displays equilibrium multiplicity,
two natural questions arise. Namely, which equilibrium is more \plausible"? Which one is
25Computations of the volume formula are available from the author upon request.
26In particular, ¿²1 = ¿v = ¿u = ° = 1 and ¿²2 2 f0;1g.
27In other words, as ¹ ! 0, endogenous variables along the HTIE and the LTIE (like market depth or
price informativeness) do not converge to the same value (i.e. their equilibrium value in the market with
long term traders).
18\stable"? To answer the ¯rst question, one has to determine on which of the two equilibria
short term traders are more likely to coordinate from an ex-ante point of view. To answer
the second question one has to ¯nd out which of the two equilibria resists shocks to the
fundamental.
To address the plausibility issue I compare the ex-ante expected utility of short termists
along the two equilibria. Suppose an unexpected shock in period 1 hits a proportion ¹ of
traders in the market, forcing them to liquidate their position. If the ex-ante expected
utility of a trader along the HTIE (LTIE) is higher than along the LTIE (HTIE), then
traders are more likely to coordinate on the HTIE (LTIE).
Indicate with ¼is;1 the ¯rst period pro¯t of a short termist. Because of normality as-
sumptions E[¡expf¡(¼is;1=°)g] = ¡(Var[xis;1](°¡2Var[p2jz1;si1]+Var[xis;1]¡1))¡(1=2); and
given that Var[xis;1] = °2 Var[p2jsi1;z1]¡2Var[E[p2 ¡ p1jz1;si1]]; we can conclude that the







where, Var[E[p2¡p1jz1;si1;a12]] and Var[p2jz1;si1;a12] indicate respectively the variance of
short termists' conditional expected returns and the conditional volatility of short termists'
returns along the LTIE. Thus, short term traders rather coordinate on the LTIE if the
variance of their expected returns, taking into account the associated risk, is larger along
the LTIE than along the HTIE.
Whether condition (6) holds crucially depends on the size of the short term trading
sector. If ¹ = 1 for a wide range of parameter values the LTIE is more plausible. 28 When
¹ < 1, the e®ect of short-term traders on prices is mitigated by long termists' trading
behavior. Hence, for low values of ¹, when either ¿u, ¿v or ° are \high," the HTIE is more
plausible. 29
Turning to the stability issue. Assume, for simplicity, that ¹ v = E[vjz1];¹ = 1 and de¯ne
the second period aggregate excess demand function along equilibrium k = 1;2 as follows
XDk ´ z2(a1k) + ¸
¡1
2 (a1k)(1 ¡ ¸2(a1k)¢a2k)¹ v ¡ ¸
¡1
2 (a1k)p2(a1k); (7)
28Numerical simulations were run with the same set of parameter values used in section 4. Intuitively,
along the HTIE both the numerator and the denominator in (6) are lower than along the LTIE. However,
the risk reduction is not high enough to compensate for the reduced variance of expected returns. Hence,
short term traders ¯nd it more pro¯table to coordinate on the LTIE.
29For these parameter values, the \compensation" that the risk premium has on second period depth is
small. Hence, the market is less liquid in the second period and both the numerator and the denominator
on the r.h.s. of (6) are higher. This e®ect coupled with the fact that for low values of ¹ short term traders'
e®ect on prices is less intense, is enough to make the HTIE more plausible.
19where XDk = 0 when the market is in equilibrium and XDk 6= 0 otherwise. 30 Figures 4
and 5 show the graph of (7) both along the LTIE and the HTIE (dotted lines).
Please insert ¯gures 4 and 5 here.
While the excess demand function in the LTIE slopes downwards, owing to ¸2(a11s) < 0
the one associated with the HTIE slopes upwards. Hence, if the price is above (below)
its equilibrium level in the LTIE an excess supply (demand) forces it back to equilibrium.
On the contrary, for a price above (below) its equilibrium level along the HTIE the value
of the excess demand function increases (decreases) moving the price further away from
equilibrium.
The intuition for this e®ect can be obtained by rewriting traders' second period strate-
gies as follows




¡1 ¡ a2)(E[vjz1] ¡ E[vjz
2]): (8)
Consider the market making part of (8) and suppose E[vjz1] > E[vjz2]: the market believes
that the value of the asset has decreased. The larger ¯¡1 with respect to a2, the more likely
is that market inference is driven by the e®ect of noise shocks on second period order °ow
(rather than by informed traders). 31 Thus, traders take the other side of the market and
buy the asset. Conversely, the smaller ¯¡1 with respect to a2, the more likely that second
period order °ow is information driven. Hence, traders align their trading to the market
and sell the asset too. The same thing happens along the HTIE where, since ¢a21 < 0,
¯ < 0. Based on these considerations, the LTIE is stable while the HTIE is unstable.
Though market behavior along the HTIE may appear counterintuitive, a positively
sloped excess demand function is in line with models of market crashes (see e.g. Gennotte
and Leland, 1990, and Barlevy and Veronesi, 2002). 32 In these models traders facing a price
30Notation: ¢a2k = a2 ¡ a1k, z2(a1k) = ¢a2kv + u2 and p2(a1k) is the second period price along
equilibrium k. To obtain (7), under the above assumptions the second period market clearing equation
reads as follows z2(a1k) + ¸
¡1
2 (a1k)(1 ¡ ¸2(a1k)¢a2k)¹ v = ¸
¡1
2 (a1k)p2(a1k). The l.h.s. of this equation
represents the second period net aggregate demand while the r.h.s. represents the second period net
aggregate supply. With this in mind, de¯ne the net aggregate excess demand (demand minus supply) as
XDk ´ z2(a1k) + ¸
¡1
2 (a1k)(1 ¡ ¸2(a1k)¢a2k)¹ v ¡ ¸
¡1
2 (a1k)p2(a1k).
31A large value of ¯¡1 means that the weight the market puts on z2 is low, while a2 low means that
informed speculators trade with little aggressiveness on their signal.
32Notice, however, that in Gennotte and Leland's case the excess demand function slopes upwards only
in the presence of unobservable hedging demand while in the present context, as in Barlevy and Veronesi,
all rational traders are fully aware of other traders' behavior.
20decrease may rationally choose to reduce their holdings of the risky asset, interpreting such
a decline as \bad news" about the asset pay-o®. Thus, an initial price decline (e.g. spurred
by a shock to fundamentals) may lead to further price reductions under an increasing selling
pressure. In the present context this is what happens in ¯gure 5. A shock (unanticipated)
to fundamentals moves the equilibrium price upwards (from the dotted to the continuous
line). At the old equilibrium price the market experiences an excess supply of the asset
which further pushes down the price. In this situation the old equilibrium price is too low
to justify the new market's quote, traders do not trust the new quote and decide to sell,
further moving the market away from equilibrium.
Notice that in the example given in ¯gure 5, the price starts declining even though
the shock to fundamentals is positive. 33 Episodes of this type are not uncommon as
argued by Eichengreen (1990) in his comparison of the stock market crashes of 1929 and
1987. 34 Notice also that along the HTIE the model does not display a \real" market crash.
Indeed for the price to tumble, a (even very small) shock to fundamentals is required. 35
However, the example still captures some of the features that characterized the 1987 crash.
According to the Brady Report (1988), sellers su®ered from an \illusion of liquidity" and
to the market mutual fund behavior \looked much like that of portfolio insurers, that is,
selling without primary regard to price." Along the HTIE short term traders in the ¯rst
period anticipate a liquid market and overreact to their signal expecting a \small" price
variation across the two periods. This makes the change in traders' desired speculative
position negative leading to a negative adverse selection e®ect that compensated by the
positive risk premium renders the second period market \deep." However, such a higher
depth comes at the price of instability, since an unanticipated shock to fundamentals moves
the market away from equilibrium.
33The actual values of the fundamentals have no particular role in the example. The important factor
determining the price decline in the presence of a positive excess supply is the negative value of second
period market depth.
34As quoted by Barlevy and Veronesi (2002), Eichengreen notes that \probably the crucial di®erence
between the two episodes was the state of the economy immediately preceding the crash. In the ¯rst nine
months of 1987, spending was strong. In October 1929, in contrast, a full-blown recession was already
under way."
35A market crash refers to a situation where the price of a stock changes dramatically despite the
absence of a change in the underlying value of its fundamentals. Technically, this requires the existence
of a discontinuity between the price and the asset supply, something that in the present model does not
happen.
216 Conclusions
In this paper, I have analyzed the e®ects of short-term behavior on stock market patterns
in the context of a dynamic rational expectations equilibrium model. Owing to risk premia,
short term horizons induce equilibrium multiplicity. In particular, two di®erent outcomes
are possible: in the LTIE, short term traders anticipate second period price overreaction
to the order °ow, scale back their trades and enforce a high volatility, low price infor-
mativeness equilibrium; along the HTIE the opposite happens and a low volatility, high
price informativeness equilibrium arises. Therefore, in contrast to the usual explanation of
return volatility in e±cient markets (see e.g. Admati and P°eiderer, 1988), short termism
coupled with traders' risk aversion makes prices less informative in more volatile markets.
To address the multiplicity issue, I have studied the excess demand functions along the
two equilibria. Owing to the negative second period depth, along the HTIE the excess
demand function slopes upwards, making the HTIE unstable.
A number of issues are left for future research. First, the N-period extension should
be considered. While analytical results exist for the case of long term traders only (He
and Wang, 1995, and Vives, 1995), there is no general analysis for the case presented
here. Next, introducing hedgers, welfare considerations could be addressed. Dow and Rahi
(2000), show that in a static context a tax on speculation, by reducing the informativeness
of the price, can improve both hedgers and speculators' welfare. In the present context, the
¯nal e®ect should depend on the structure of the equilibrium set. E®ects on investment
decisions could also be considered: to the extent that stock market prices at the same time
accomplish the role of indicators for ¯rms' decisions and aggregate information dispersed
among traders in the economy, equilibria with low price informativeness should lead to
sub-optimal decisions. Finally, by considering a multi-asset framework (Admati, 1985, and
Cespa, 1999), one could characterize how risk premia interact across di®erent assets.
22APPENDIX
First, I state a well known result on multivariate normal random variables (see e.g. Danthine
and Moresi 1992).
Lemma 1 Let Q(w) be a quadratic function of the vector w: Q(w) = D +b
0w ¡w0Aw,


















Proof of Proposition 1
Notice that in every linear equilibrium, the sequences zn and pn, n = 1;2 are obser-
vationally equivalent (o.e.). To see this, assume a candidate linear symmetric equilibrium
xi1 = a1si1 ¡ '1(p1); xi2 = a2~ si2 ¡ '2(p1;p2); where '1(p1) and '2(p1;p2) are two lin-
ear functions. Market clearing in period 1 implies that
R 1
0 a1si1di ¡ '1(p1) + u1 = 0: By
the SLLN the previous condition is equivalent to z1 ¡ '1(p1) = 0: Therefore, (owing to
the linearity of '1(¢)) z1 is o.e. to p1. Consider now period 2. Market clearing gives
R 1
0 a2~ si2di ¡ '2(p1;p2) + u1 + u2 = 0; by the SLLN a2v ¡ '2(p1;p2) + u1 + u2 = 0: Adding
and subtracting a1v to the previous expression gives z1 +z2 ¡'2(p1;p2) = 0: Therefore, as
in period 2 z1 and p1 are known, p2 is o.e. to z2. Thus, fp1;p2g and fz1;z2g are o.e..
Next, in period n = 2 because of normality of the random variables and CARA utility
functions, xi2 = ° (Var[vjz2;~ si2])
¡1 (E [vjz2;~ si2] ¡ p2): Given that z2 and p2 are observa-
tionally equivalent traders' expectations are given by E [vjz2]=¿
¡1
2 (¿v¹ v+ ¿u
P2
t=1(¢at)zt)








; where ¿2 = ¿v + ¿u
P2
t=1(¢at)2; and
¿i2 = ¿2 +
P2







(~ si2 ¡ p2) + °¿2(E[vjz
2] ¡ p2): (9)
The second period market clearing equation reads as follows:
R 1
0 xi2 di + u1 + u2 = 0;
where u1 and u2 are the (uncorrelated) supply increments of the traded asset. By the
strong law of large numbers we can rewrite it as a2(v ¡p2)+°¿2(E[vjz2]¡p2)+u1 +u2 =
0. Adding and subtracting a1v to the previous expression z1 + z2 + °¿2E[vjz2] = (a2 +
°¿2)p2; and, by using the previously given de¯nitions, p2 = (1¡¸2¢a2)(1¡¸1la1)¹ v +(1¡
¸2¢a2)¸1lz1 + ¸2z2; where ¸2 = (1 + °¿u¢a2)=(a2 + °¿2) and ¸1l = (1 + °¿ua1)=(a1 + °¿1).
23To obtain period 1 strategies, one substitutes period 2 strategy into the objective function
of the informed, obtaining E[¡expf¡°¡1¼i2gjz2;~ si2] = ¡expf¡x2
i2=2°2¿i2g: Going back
one step, the function that traders maximize is E[¡expf¡Qi1=°g jz1;si1]; where Qi1 =
(p2 ¡ p1)xi1 + x2
i2=2°¿i2: Applying lemma 1 as in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1996), the
above optimization problem is solved by
xi1 =




























Tedious calculations allow to obtain G1 = ¸2
2=(¿i1¸2
2+¿u(1¡¸2¢a2)2), G2 = (¿u¢a2¸2+
¿²2¸2
2)=(¿i2(¿i1¸2
2 +¿u(1¡¸2¢a2)2)), E[p2jz1;si1] = ¸2¢a2E[vjz1;si1]+(1¡¸2¢a2)p1l; and
E[xi2jz1;si1] = °¿i2 (1¡ ¸2¢a2) (E[vjz1;si1] ¡ p1l); where p1l = ¸1lz1 + (1 ¡ ¸1la1)¹ v. Iden-
tifying parameters, informed ¯rst period trading intensity is given by a1 = °¿²1. Finally,












1 )p1 + ¸
¡1
1 (1 ¡ a1¸1)¹ v = a2(~ si2 ¡ p2) + °¿2(E[vjz2] ¡ p2):
QED
Proof of Proposition 3
As in period 2 short and long term traders' horizons coincide, xis;2 and xil;2 are given by (9).
Imposing market clearing,
R ¹
0 xis;2 di +
R 1
¹ xil;2 di + u1 + u2 = 0: The second period market
clearing price and depth are given by p2 = ¸2z2+(1¡¸2¢a2)p1l and ¸2 = (a2+°¿2)¡1(1+
°¿u¢a2).
In the ¯rst period, trading horizons di®er and the market clearing equation reads as
follows
R ¹
0 xis;1 di +
R 1
¹ xil;1 di + u1 = 0: Long term traders' ¯rst period strategy is given
by (10) and with an argument along the lines of the previous proof one can show that
a1l = °¿²1. For short term traders, because of short term horizons,
xis;1 = °(Var[p2jp1;si1])
¡1(E[p2jp1;si1] ¡ p1); (11)
where Var[p2jp1;si1] = ¸2
2((¿2 + ¿²1)=¿i1¿u): Using the formulas for the conditional ex-
pectation and the conditional variance obtained in the proof of proposition 1 and plug-








2¢a2(1 + (¹½ + (1 ¡ ¹))°a1¿u)




(1 ¡ ¸2¢a2)¸2(a1s + °½¿1)
¸2 (¹½°¿i1 + (1 ¡ ¹)(°¿2Á + a1l¸2¢a2))
¶
+ (1 ¡ ¹)¸1l
µ
°¢a2¿u(1 ¡ ¸2¢a2)2
¸2 (¹½°¿i1 + (1 ¡ ¹)(°¿2Á + a1l¸2¢a2))
¶
;
and Á = ¸2¢a2(1 ¡ ®) + (1 ¡ ¸2¢a2)®.
Notice that (4) implicitly de¯nes short termists' ¯rst period trading intensity. Therefore,
existence of an equilibrium, depends on the existence of a real solution to (4). Given that
® = ¢a2¿u(a2 + °¿2)=(¿2(1 + °¿u¢a2)); equation (4) can be rewritten as follows: F(a1s) ´
a1s(¿2+¿²1)(1+°¿u¢a2)¡°¿u¢a2¿²1(a2+°¿2) = 0: From here one can check that F(0) < 0




As F(¢) is continuous, there exists a a¤




Proof of corollary 1
For part 1, given that a1l = °¿²1, the result follows. Next, for a1s, assume that ¢a2 <
¡1=°¿u, in this case, ¢a2 < 0 and ® > 0, hence a1s > 0. Alternatively, suppose ¡1=°¿u <
¢a2 < 0, then ® < 0, hence a1s < 0. However, in this case, ¢a2 = a2¡a1 > 0, contradicting
the assumption. Therefore, a1s > 0 and ® > 0. QED
Proof of proposition 4
Parts 1 and 2 directly follow from the proof of proposition 3. For part 3, expliciting (4)
a1s = °¢a2¿u(°¿2 + a2)¿²1=((¿2 + ¿²1)(1 + °¿u¢a2)). Assume that the denominator on the
r.h.s. of the previous equation is non null (at equilibrium), then rearranging we obtain:
a1s(¿2 + ¿²1)(1 + °¿u¢a2) ¡ °¢a2¿u¿²1(a2 + °¿2) = 0; which is a quartic in a1s. If ¿²2 = 0,
the previous equilibrium condition becomes
¡(a
2














While equation (a) has two real roots, equation (b) only possesses imaginary solutions. In
particular a11s;a12s = ((1+2°2¿²1¿u)§(1+4°2¿²1¿u)1=2)=2°¿u. This solution clearly satis¯es
25the condition 1 + °¿u¢a2 6= 0. Direct comparison of the obtained solutions with the long
term case gives a12s < a1l < a11s; and ®(a12s) < 1 < ®(a11s).
QED
Proof of proposition 5
For part 1, ¸2(a11s) < 0 , 4°2¿²1¿u > 0; which is always true. Next, as a12s < a1l,
¸2(a12s) > 0. For part 2,j¸2(a11s)j < ¸2(a12s) , ¸2
2(a11s) < ¸2
2(a12s). Substituting equilib-
rium values for a11s and a12s, the last inequality is always satis¯ed. QED
Proof of proposition 6
Tedious computations lead to xis;1 = a1¢ssi1 ¡ z1; xi1 = a1lsi1 ¡ z1; and xi2 = a2~ si2 ¡ z1 ¡
z2. Since if Y » N(0;¾2), then E[jY j] =
p
(2=¼)¾2, one obtains that E[jxis;1(a1¢s)j] =
((2=¼)(¿¡1
u +a1¢s¿¡1
²1 ))1=2 and E[jxi1j] = ((2=¼)(¿¡1
u +a1l¿¡1
²1 ))1=2: Hence, the result follows.
For the second part a similar argument leads to E[jxi2¡xis;1(a1¢s)j] = ((2=¼)(¿¡1
u +°a1l(1¡
½)2))1=2; E[jxi2 ¡ xi1j] = (2=¼¿u)1=2: Substituting the solutions of short term traders' ¯rst
period trading intensities, the result follows. QED
Proof of proposition 7
For part 2, substitute the equilibrium values found in proposition 4 in the expression for
Var[p2jp1;a1¢s] and check that Var[p2jp1;a11s]¡Var[p2jp1;a12s] < 0 is always satis¯ed. QED
Proof of corollary 2
Follows immediately generalizing the last part of proposition 4's proof to the case 0 < ¹ < 1;
a11s;a12s = ((1 + 2°2¹¿²1¿u) § (1 + 4°2¹¿²1¿u)1=2)=(2°¹¿u): QED
Proof of corollary 3
For part 1, ¸2(a11) < 0 , 4°2¹¿²1¿u > 0 which is always true. Next, since ¹(a1l¡a12s) > 0,
¸2(a12s) > 0. The last part of the proposition follows from generalizing the proofs of
propositions 5 and 7 to the case 0 < ¹ < 1. QED
Proof of Proposition 8
For part 1, @¿1(a1¢)=@¹ = 2a1¢¿u((a1¢s ¡a1l)+¹(@a1¢s=@¹)) and substituting @a1¢s=@¹ gives
the result. For part 2, @¿2(a1¢)=@¹ = (@¿1(a1¢)=@¹) ¡ 2¿u¢a2(@a1¢s=@¹). This expression




1 + 4¹°2¿²1¿u; which is positive if and only if ¹ 2 (0;1=2 + °a1l¿u=4)
and negative otherwise. QED
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Figure 1: First period trading intensities (a), ¯rst and second period price informativeness
(b,c) and second period market depth (d) as a function of ¿²1. Parameter values: ° = 1 and
¿v = ¿u = 1, while ¿²1 = ¿²2 2 f1;2;:::;10g. Solid (thin) curves refer to the HTIE (LTIE).
Dotted curves refer to the unique equilibrium in the market with long term traders only.












































Figure 2: Returns' conditional volatility as a function of ¿²1 (a). Parameter values: ° = 1
and ¿v = ¿u = 1, while ¿²1 = ¿²2 2 f1;2;:::;10g. Second period market depth, ¯rst
and second period price informativeness as a function of ¹ (b,c and d). Parameter values:
¿²1 = ¿²2;¿v;¿u;° 2 f:1;:4;:7;1g and ¹ 2 f:1;:2;:::;:9g. Solid (thin) curves refer to the
HTIE (LTIE).






























Figure 3: Conditional volatility of returns as a function of ¹ (a); expected total volume as
a function of ¹ with concentrated and constant arrival of information (b and c). Parameter
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Figure 4: Excess demand function along the LTIE. Parameter values: ¹ v = v = ¿²2 = 0,
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Figure 5: Excess demand function along the HTIE. Parameter values: ¹ v = v = ¿²2 = 0,
¿²1 = ¿v = ¿u = ° = 1, and u2 = 1:56.
32